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"WATER MINING" AND WYOMING LAW
Past thinking in the field of underground water law has been based
upon the idea that water is a "flow resource," i.e., one of ". . . those resources whereof 'different units become available for use in different
intervals. . . . The present flow does not diminish future flow, and it is
possible to maintain use indefinitely provided the flow continues.''"
In some areas of the arid west, however, supplies of underground water
have been discovered, in some of which the water is available for use, but
because of the dryness of the climate, there is little or no recharge into the
area. Consequently, each drop used in excess of the recharge amount is
gone, just as each drop of oil pumped out of the ground is gone. In these
areas water must be treated as a "stock resource," i.e., one of ". . . those
resources whose 'total physical quantity does not increase significantly
with time . . . each rate of use diminishes some future rate.' "2 Because
each rate of present use will prevent a use in some future time, an "overdraft" will result, the water table will be lowered, and eventual depletion
of the storage area will ensue. 3 However, before depletion occurs, increased
costs may prevent continuing development. Consequently, any evaluation
of the legal aspects of the problem must include a consideration of the
concept of "safe yield." "Safe yield" is composed of many factors; for
example, the return from use, the cost of applying the resource, and the
cost of obtaining the resource. Additional factors to be considered are
the benefits to primary users and present and future benefits to secondary
beneficiaries in the area.4 Although at the danger of oversimplification, the
problem of "safe yield" can best be explained by the following example.
If the return from use is one hundred dollars an acre and the cost of
application is ten dollars an acre, there remains ninety dollars as profit
margin and for obtaining the resource. If the water table is at fifty feet
and it costs fifty dollars per acre to bring up water from that depth, the
user still has a possible profit margin of forty dollars. If the water table is
lowered to seventy-five feet and the cost is increased proportionately, the
profit margin is lowered to fifteen dollars an acre. If the water table is
further lowered, the cost will be increased proportionately, the user's
profit margin will further decrease, and eventually he will no longer be
able to make a living at that particular use. This concept of "safe yield"
applies to storage areas that have sufficient recharge to allow prolonged
development, but the problem is more pressing in areas that have no
recharge. 5 As the demand for water increases, it will be necessary to use
those storage areas at an ever increasing rate, thus accentuating the problem. Wyoming must plan now to meet it.
New Mexico, Texas, and Arizona have already struggled with the
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problem, and their solutions have been far from consistent. Arizona6 and
Texas 7 follow variations of the rule of common law regarding percolating
waters-the land owner owns the percolating waters. Statutory attempts,
however, have been made in those states to provide for some type of
administrative control to prevent rapid depletion of this resource.
Texas has tried to solve the problem of water mining by creating
water control districts.' These districts are run in much the same manner
as in the administration of water law in a prior appropriation system. 9 In
these water control districts the spacing of wells may be controlled, waste
prevented, permits issued, and beneficial use required. However, these
water control districts control only wells that are capable of producing
150,000 gallons per day. 10
Arizona has provided a different solution. The State Land Commissioner is given the power to declare critical ground-water areas and
During a recent
to stop further irrigation development in such areas."
session of the state legislature, the Central Valley was declared a critical
2
area by act of the legislature and all future development was stopped.'
On the other hand, no authority is given the Land Commissioner to limit
withdrawals and thus stop overdevelopment once it has occurred. It has
been suggested that the only way that he might have this power would be
if the area were found to be a "definite watercourse," thus coming under
the law of watercourses and requiring regulation under prior appropriation. l 3
New Mexico has a prior appropriation system, and it has applied
this system to its underground water law. 14 However, prior appropriation
needs some clarification in a water mining system. If the traditional
appropriation in perpetuity were claimed, the first appropriator possibly
could demand all the water in the basin and thus be forever protected,
while the remainder of the area law was undeveloped. New Mexico has
therefore used the concept of an appropriation for a limited term. In
the Lea County Basin in southeastern New Mexico, it was found that at
the present rate of use all the water would be used up within a period of
sixty years, although it would be economically unfeasible to use it for
agriculture beyond the period of forty years.' 5 An underground basin was
determined and water use planned to protect present users, with the wells
spaced so that maximum benefit would occur. 16 Priority of appropriation
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is given effect by denying permits to later applicants when the number
of permits has reached the maximum that can efficiently use the water.
Each user is aware that he has not an appropriation in perpetuity but one
lasting for only a period of years. No court cases have been brought to
the appellate level since the initiation of this plan.
The principal obstacles to the application of the theory of "water
mining" to any area is the possibility of the administrator's possessing
only a limited scope of authority due to the preexistence of vested property
rights in the water. In order to provide a sustained yield for the maximum
benefit, an administrator must have the power to determine the optimum
amount of withdrawal, either by preventing new withdrawls or by limiting
present withdrawals. The State Engineer of Wyoming has that power in
regard to permits issued after 1957.17 Upon determining a critical area,' 8
the State Engineer and the Board of Control shall issue corrective controls.19 These corrective controls may consist of any or all of the following:
(a) closing the area to future appropriation, (b) determining permissible
total withdrawal and apportioning that total withdrawal, (c) requiring
junior appropriators to cease withdrawal, and (d) specifying a system of
rotation.
Thus, the State Engineer has the power to regulate a "water mining"
area for maximum benefit. Furthermore, no user who receives a permit
after 1957 can require that the water level be maintained at any level other
than that required for maximum beneficial use.2 0 While the statute does
not indicate whether maximum benefical use shall be that of the individual
user or that of a particular group, it further specifies that 2 ' the State
Engineer may issue any permit subject to such condition as he may find
to be in the public interest. 2 2 Consequently, maximum benefical use must
be for the benefit of the entire area rather than that of the individual
user.
The crux of the problem of regulation of water mining in Wyoming
23
is the user who acquired his rights prior to the passage of the 1957 statute.
The question is, even though such a user may have a vested property right,
may the State Engineer issue regulations that would deprive that user of
water?

While such a user may have a vested property right, 24 it is limited
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it is not the quantity of water that controls in a water mining situation,
but the ability to draw it to the surface. Assume a situation in which
several appropriators are each using a water right of 100 units to achieve
a profit margin of 25 per cent per user. The water table drops, since
there is no recharge, and the profit margin drops to 10 per cent per user
because of increased pumping costs. The first user would not be benefited
by shutting off junior appropriators, since that would not increase his
profit margin. The only way the first user could be put in his original
position would be to allow him to use more units of water. To give him a
larger water right than that to which he is entitled at the expense of others
would be unconstitutional. 26 Thus, in this situation, refusal to apply prior
appropriation doctrine in this function would be constitutional even with
respect to a user who acquired his right prior to the passage of the 1957
statute.
A more complicated situation is that in which a basin has a pre-1957
user, some post-19 57 users, and the State Engineer determines the basin to
be a critical area of water mining. As a result of his investigation, he
determines the area to have an economically useful life of 60 years. Yet
he adds two more users, which will shorten the water use in the basin to
40 years, and then closes the area to further appropriation. Have the
users who were present prior to a "critical area" determination been deprived of a legal right by the shortening of the life of the basin by 20
years? Three reasons must make the answer to this question "no." One,
there was additional water economically available. The two newest users
were entitled to their appropriation even though it would shorten the life
of the basin by 20 years. An analogy could be drawn here to unappropriated stream flow for which the State Engineer could not refuse a valid
appropriation application. 27 Two, consider that the State Engineer must
regulate for maximum benefit of the entire area. The addition of the two
new users may have increased benefits much more over the 40-year period
than if appropriation were closed prior to the granting of their permits.
Three, while the state guarantees a right to use water, it does not guarantee
2
that the water will be present. s
With reference to the previous situation, consider the possibility of
the State Engineer making a mistake as to the length of the economically
useful life of the basin. Can he now apportion water equitably among all
the users and cut the amount of their water right? Again, consider the
controlling factor to be the ability to draw water economically, not the
presence of water. If an equitable apportionment is the only way to
reduce the downdraft on the water table, then the State Engineer can
properly do so. Not to do so would decrease the profit margin of the prior
users rather than increase it, much as in the situation previously discussed
26.
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of not using the prior appropriation doctrine. Again, the action of the
State Engineer would be constitutional even as to prior users.
Additional factors to consider in the solution of the problem are the
use of surface water and a lowering of the amount of applied water per
acre. While a certain amount of water may be required to create the
maximum unit return, the cost of this water may, when the water table is
lowered, be such that it is more feasible to use surface water combined with
smaller amounts of underground water to achieve maximum unit return.
Consideration should also be given to lowering the amount of return from
use by decreasing the application of water. While the return will be
lowered, the cost will also be lowered, perhaps to a lesser, perhaps to a
29
greater degree.
The State Engineer of Wyoming has the power to consider all of
these factors in making his determination for control of "critical areas."
Should a "critical area" occur in which users who obtained their rights
prior to passage of the statute are present and should the physical factors
require it, the principles of water mining could be used for maximum
benefit under the present statute. The controls are present in the statute
to effectively regulate even those users, although they acquired their rights
prior to its passage in 1957. While a contention of unconstitutionality
might be made, a shift in thinking by the courts from the idea of quantity
of water as the controlling factor to the idea of ability to acquire the water
economically for maximum benefical use as the controlling factor should
be effective enough to rebut the contention of unconstitutionality and to
uphold the regulations of the State Engineer.
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